Endress+Hauser WirelessHART Fieldgate SWG70 3.x devices allow Directory Traversal via the fcgi-bin/wgsetcgi filename parameter.

Endress+Hauser Ecograph T (Neutral/Private Label) (RSG35, ORSG35) with Firmware version prior to V2.0.0 is prone to improper privilege management. The affected device has a web-based user interface with a role-based access system. Users with different roles have different write and read privileges. The access system is based on dynamic "tokens". The vulnerability is that user sessions are not closed correctly and a user with fewer rights is assigned the higher rights when he logs on.

Endress+Hauser Ecograph T (Neutral/Private Label) (RSG35, ORSG35) and Memograph M (Neutral/Private Label) (RSG45, ORSG45) with Firmware version V2.0.0 and above is prone to exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor. The firmware release has a dynamic token for each request submitted to the server, which makes repeating requests and analysis complex enough. Nevertheless, it's possible and during the analysis it was discovered that it also has an issue with the access-control matrix on the server-side. It was found that a user with low rights can get information from endpoints that should not be available to this user.

The application is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. An attacker is able to dump the PostgreSQL database and read its content.

Several credentials for the local PostgreSQL database are stored in plain text (partially base64 encoded).

The maxView Storage Manager does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it susceptible to brute-force attacks.

Multiple services of the DUT as well as different scopes of the same service reuse the same credentials.

The web application is susceptible to cross-site-scripting attacks. An attacker can create a prepared URL, which injects JavaScript code into the website. The code is executed in the victim’s browser when an authenticated administrator clicks the link.

The web application is susceptible to cross-site-scripting attacks. An attacker who can create new dashboards can inject JavaScript code into the dashboard name which will be executed when the website is loaded.

The MEAC300-FNADE4 does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it susceptible to brute-force attacks.

The Secure attribute is missing on multiple cookies provided by the MEAC300-FNADE4. An attacker can trick a user to establish an unencrypted HTTP connection to the server and intercept the request containing the PHPSESSID cookie.

For failed login attempts, the application returns different error messages depending on whether the login failed due to an incorrect password or a non-existing username. This allows an attacker to guess usernames until they find an existing one.

The configuration of the Apache httpd webserver which serves the MEAC300-FNADE4 web application, is partly insecure. There are modules activated that are not required for the operation of the FNADE4 web application. The functionality of the some modules pose a risk to the webserver which enable dircetory listing.

The HttpOnly flag is set to false on the PHPSESSION cookie. Therefore, the cookie can be accessed by other sources such as JavaScript.

The application is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery. An attacker can trick a valid, logged in user into submitting a web request that they did not intend. The request uses the victim's browser's saved authorization to execute the request.

The web application is vulnerable to clickjacking attacks. The site can be embedded into another frame, allowing an attacker to trick a user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives, thus potentially revealing confidential information or allowing others to take control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous objects.

The SMB server's login mechanism does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it susceptible to brute-force attacks.

All communication between the VNC server and client(s) is unencrypted. This allows an attacker to intercept the traffic and obtain sensitive data.

The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.

The VNC application stores its passwords encrypted within the registry but uses DES for encryption. As DES is broken, the original passwords can be recovered.

The hard drives of the device are not encrypted using a full volume encryption feature such as BitLocker. This allows an attacker with physical access to the device to use an alternative operating system to interact with the hard drives, completely circumventing the Windows login. The attacker can read from and write to all files on the hard drives.

During startup, the device automatically logs in the EPC2 Windows user without requesting a password.